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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 10-4666 
_________ 
 
JOSEPH COMPRELLI, M&J COMPRELLI 
REALTY, LLC, JOSEPH SUPOR III, J. 
SUPOR & SON TRUCKING & RIGGINGS 
CO., INC. and S&B REALTY CO., 
                                        Appellants 
v. 
 
TOWN OF HARRISON, HARRISON 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, THE 
TOWN COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF 
HARRISON, and PAUL J. ZARBETSKI, 
CLERK OF THE TOWN OF HARRISON, 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03013) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise 
_______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
and STENGEL,
*
 District Judge 
 
(Filed: February 16, 2012) 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
                                              
*
 Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
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STENGEL, District Judge.  
This case involves a zoning dispute and concerns a lengthy history involving 
Appellants, Mr. Comprelli, M&J Comprelli Realty, Joseph Supor III, J. Supor & Son 
Trucking & Rigging Co., Inc. and S&B Realty (collectively “Comprelli”), and Appellees, 
the Town of Harrison (the “Town”), Harrison Redevelopment Agency (the “Agency”), 
the Town Council of the Town of Harrison (the “Council”), and Paul J. Zarbetski, Clerk 
of the Town of Harrison (the “Clerk”).1   
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, our recitation of the facts and 
procedural history is brief.  Since 1988, Comprelli has owned commercial surface 
parking lots (the “Parking Lot”) located at 1000 Frank E. Rodgers Boulevard South in the 
Town of Harrison.  In 1998, the Town Council adopted a redevelopment plan (the 
“Redevelopment Plan”), which encompassed Appellants‟ parking lots, changing the 
zoning such that surface parking lots were no longer a permitted use.  In 2003, the Town 
adopted an amended Redevelopment Plan allowing for certain interim uses, including 
surface parking lots, subject to Planning Board approval. 
In 2008 and 2009, Comprelli obtained licenses to operate up to 1,050 parking 
spaces on his lot.  However, when Comprelli filed for yet another renewal of his licenses 
in 2010, the Clerk noticed that Comprelli had not filed the required plat showing the 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District Court‟s 
grant of the motion to dismiss.  See Omnipoint Communications Enters., L.P. v. Newton 
Township, 219 F.3d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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requested 1,050 spaces.  The last plat on file was for 198 spaces, so the Clerk issued a 
license for that amount and advised Comprelli that any increase in spaces would require 
Planning Board approval. 
Comprelli filed suit in federal court
2
 and, in addition to this action, commenced 
suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey in lieu of prerogative writs.
3
  The state action 
was dismissed by Judge Velazquez with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies and failure to state a cause of action.  On November 16, 2010, the District Court 
entered an order dismissing Comprelli‟s Sherman Act claim pursuant to the Parker 
doctrine
4
 and dismissing the remaining claims as barred by res judicata based on the 
State‟s order.  After a motion for reconsideration, Judge Velazquez, modified the state 
                                              
2
 Appellants claimed constitutional violations of equal protection (Count One), due 
process (Count Two), and improper restraint on and partial taking of property (Count 
Three).  The complaint also alleged violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. 
(Count Four) and § 1983 (Count Eight).  Finally, Appellants asserted state law claims 
under the New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J.S.A. 56:9-1, et seq. (Count Five), tortious 
interference with contractual relationships (Count Six), and tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantages (Count Seven). 
 
3
 The state action alleges all of the same counts as the federal complaint, but does not 
include Federal Complaint Counts Four through Seven.  See Joseph Comprelli, et al. v. 
Town of Harrison, et al. No. HUD-L-3169-10 (Oct. 19, 2010).  
 
4
 The Parker doctrine or “state-action” doctrine shields state governments from antitrust 
liability for anti-competitive actions taken in their capacity as sovereigns to further policy 
goals.  Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 255 (3d Cir. 2001).  The 
Parker doctrine applies indirectly to local municipalities where the suppression of 
competition is an authorized implementation of state policy.  City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370, 373 (1991).   
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court‟s dismissal order on January 13, 2011, dismissing Counts One through Three 
without prejudice.
5
   
Despite the modified state court order for Counts 1-3, the District Court declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as all federal causes of 
action were barred by either res judicata or the Parker doctrine.  Comprelli timely 
appealed.  
II. 
Comprelli claims that the District Court erred by finding that the federal claims 
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claims were dismissed in error 
and the state court modified its dismissal of the state law claims to dismiss without 
prejudice.  Comprelli also contends that the District Court erred by failing to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.  We disagree. 
Res judicata bars a subsequent suit on the same cause of action when there is a 
judgment in a prior suit involving the same parties.  CoreStates Bank, NA v. Huls 
America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999).  In applying the doctrine, the District 
Court must accord preclusive effect to the prior decisions of state courts.  Rycoline 
Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unltd., 109 F.3d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1997).  See also Marrese v. Am. 
Acad. Of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) (federal courts “look first at 
the state preclusion law in determining the preclusive effects of a state court judgment”).  
                                              
5
 The three counts were Count One (Inverse Condemnation), Count Two (Failure to Issue 
Required Parking License for 1,050 Spaces), and Count Three (Improper Revocation of 
Parking License). 
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Under New Jersey law, for the application of res judicata to a given action requires (1) 
the judgment in the first action is valid, final and on the merits
6
; (2) the parties in both 
actions are the same or are in privity; and (3) the claims in the second action arise from 
the same transaction or occurrence as the claims in the first.  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l 
Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991).   
Appellants argue that the claims dismissed with prejudice were in error and thus 
cannot be banned by the doctrine of res judicata.  The District Court properly stated, and 
we agree, that the preclusive effect of a final judgment cannot be challenged on the basis 
of “errors” in its legal conclusion.  Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 
398 (1981) (“A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the 
law is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review and not 
by bringing another action upon the same cause of action.”). 
Additionally, Appellants contend that because the state court‟s decision was 
amended, dismissing Counts One through Three without prejudice, the District Court 
erred in barring Appellants‟ claims under res judicata.  Appellants‟ Br. at 23-25.  As the 
District Court appropriately reasoned, “[w]ith the exception of the Sherman Act claims,” 
the remaining counts dismissed without prejudice “arise under New Jersey law.”  
Therefore, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”  Hedges v. 
Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  Accordingly, the 
                                              
6
 It is well established that a “judgment entered „with prejudice‟ is the equivalent of a 
judgment entered on the merits and is considered a final judgment.”  Citizens Voices 
Ass’n v. Collings Lakes Civic Ass’n, 396 N.J. Super. Ct. 432, 444 (App. Div. 2007). 
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District Court properly dismissed Counts Five, Six, and Seven as there were no 
remaining federal claims, and Appellants had an entirely adequate state court venue in 
which to pursue their claims. 
Comprelli also argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Sherman Act 
claim pursuant to the Parker doctrine because Appellees were motivated not by 
redevelopment but by monetary gain.  We disagree.   
Although under Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 
1997), the District Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), held that 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”  The District Court must distinguish between factual allegations and “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
Therefore, in analyzing the Appellants‟ Sherman Act claim, the Court must 
determine if the assertions in the complaint are enough to “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  As explained in A.D. Bedell Wholesale 
Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2001), the Parker doctrine 
shields state governments from antitrust liability for anti-competitive actions taken in 
their capacity as sovereigns.  The Parker doctrine does not apply directly to local 
municipalities; however, a municipality‟s restriction of competition may be an 
implementation of protected state policy.  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 
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Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991).  For instance, a local government‟s actions are protected 
under Parker where the “suppression of competition is the „foreseeable result‟ of what 
the statute authorizes.”  Id. at 373.  The statute at issue is New Jersey‟s Local 
Redevelopment and Housing Law N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq., which is a zoning 
regulation that delegates broad authority to municipalities and redevelopment entities to 
rehabilitate blighted areas.  See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8.  The Supreme Court has held that 
“[t]he very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a 
manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, particularly 
on the part of new entrants.”  Omni, 499 U.S. at 373. 
Appellants argue that the Parker doctrine does not apply because “the purpose of 
Appellee‟s actions was not to further the Town‟s redevelopment plan,” but rather 
monetary gain.  Appellants‟ Br. at 7, 37.  Therefore, its actions were not taken in 
connection with a valid redevelopment plan, and cannot be protected as such.  The 
District Court did not err in finding that “nothing in Plaintiffs‟ complaint suggests that the 
Town‟s actions were not taken in connection with a valid redevelopment plan.”  
Appellants‟ legal conclusions were unsupported, and the District Court is not “bound to 
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1950.  Therefore, we find that the District Court properly dismissed Appellants‟ Sherman 
Act claim.  
 
III. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal in all 
respects.  
 
